How pre-IPO risk compares with venture capital risk
How can investors hedge unicorn stock risk before an IPO? Shares of a private company generally cannot be hedged the way listed stock can, because there are no listed options or futures on them and they cannot be borrowed to sell short. Risk is managed instead through the choice of later-stage companies, which on PitchBook data as of 5 August 2021 fail less often than early-stage ones, and through entry price, share class, position size and spreading exposure across several companies.
Key takeaways
- Venture capital and late-stage pre-IPO investing sit at opposite ends of the same asset class: venture funds companies that mostly fail, late-stage investing buys into companies that have already survived.
- PitchBook measured company failure rates falling from 23.6% at Series A to 10.8% at Series E, on data as of 5 August 2021.
- Buying only in established companies already valued above one billion dollars is a structurally different risk profile from early-stage venture, not a risk-free one.
- A lower company failure rate is not the same as a lower investor loss rate: a secondary buyer pays a market price and carries entry-price risk that a primary investor does not.
Late-stage private companies fail less often than early-stage start-ups, and that difference is the whole basis of the distinction between venture capital and late-stage pre-IPO investing. A venture fund deliberately backs young companies in the expectation that most will return nothing and a few will return everything. A late-stage investor buys into companies that already have revenue, institutional governance and a valuation above one billion dollars, and so is exposed to a much narrower set of outcomes, both on the downside and on the upside.
What the failure data shows
The clearest published measurement of failure by financing stage comes from PitchBook, which measured company failure rates declining at every subsequent round. The figures below are company failure rates by financing round, on data as of 5 August 2021.
| Financing round | Failure rate, company count | Failure rate, dollar basis |
|---|---|---|
| Series A | 23.6% | 16.1% |
| Series B | 16.7% | 12.5% |
| Series C | 13.5% | 9.8% |
| Series D | 12.1% | 9.6% |
| Series E | 10.8% | 7.7% |
Industry Ventures reached the same conclusion from the other direction in February 2017, putting the early-stage loss rate at about 65% against less than 30% for later-stage companies. Correlation Ventures, writing on 13 July 2023, found that nearly half of all venture financings over the previous decade lost money for investors and that under 4% of invested capital returned ten times or more. Those figures describe the early-stage venture model, not the late-stage one.
Why the comparison is not the whole story
The failure figures above are real but they should be read with three qualifications, each of which cuts against reading them as a promise of safety.
- The PitchBook data is an analyst note from December 2022 measured as of August 2021, and it predates the down-round and write-down cycle that followed. There is no equivalent refreshed table.
- A company reaching a Series E has by definition already survived four earlier rounds, so part of the declining failure rate is selection rather than resilience.
- Later-stage cohorts are younger and have had less time to fail, which mechanically flatters the late-stage figure.
What still goes wrong in a late-stage investment
A company that will almost certainly still exist in five years can still be a poor investment, and the risks that remain in late-stage pre-IPO are mostly about price, structure and time rather than about business failure.
- Entry price. A secondary buyer pays a negotiated market price, not a primary round price, and the spread between negotiated prices for the same company is wide. Published secondary market data for August 2026 puts the median trade at a 3% discount to the last primary round, with the 25th percentile at a 30% discount and the 75th at an 11% premium. Which side of that distribution a buyer lands on is a function of sourcing and negotiation, not of the company.
- Liquidity. There is no guarantee of an exit and no obligation on the company to provide one. FINRA lists the absence of a readily available secondary market as a principal risk.
- Structure. Preferred shares carry liquidation preferences that can leave common stock worth far less than the headline valuation implies.
- Dilution and time. A further round at a lower valuation reduces the value of an existing stake, and holding periods of several years are normal.
- Transfer restrictions. The company can refuse to approve a transfer, which can void a transaction after it has been agreed.
How this shapes the way Unicorn Private invests
Unicorn Private acquires secondary stakes only in established, high-capitalisation private technology companies, the companies commonly called unicorns, and does not invest in early-stage start-ups. That is a deliberate choice about where in the risk curve to operate: it gives up the possibility of a hundredfold return on a seed position in exchange for a far lower rate of outright business failure, a company with audited financials and institutional investors already on the register, and a visible path to an exit. It does not remove the risks listed above, and nothing on this site should be read as a promise of return.
The short answer
Late-stage pre-IPO and venture capital are not the same risk. On the published data, companies fail progressively less often at each successive financing round, and by the late stage the failure rate is roughly half the Series A rate. What a late-stage investor takes on instead is price risk and time, which are managed through due diligence, entry discipline, holding period and portfolio construction rather than through a portfolio of expected write-offs.
Frequently asked questions
- Not with exchange-traded instruments, since none exist for a private company. Private forward contracts on future shares are sometimes offered, but they add counterparty risk and depend on the company recognising the transfer, which it can refuse. For most holders the practical tools are diversification and position sizing.
- Usually not. Lock-up agreements typically prohibit not only sales but also short sales, options and other hedging transactions on the locked-up shares until the restriction lapses. Holders should read the exact terms in their own agreement and in the prospectus.
Does investing in several unicorns reduce risk?
- It reduces the risk that a single company failure or down round dominates the result, but not the features shared by all private holdings, such as the absence of a public market and uncertain exit timing. Investing involves the risk of losing capital. The Unicorn Academy pre-IPO course is a structured introduction to private markets and their risks.
Related guides
- Pre-IPO investing vs private equity vs venture capital
- Pre-IPO due diligence checklist
- What is pre-IPO investing?
- Unicorn Club
About the publisher
This guide is published by Unicorn Private Research, the research arm of Unicorn Private LLC, a Delaware private equity firm that acquires secondary stakes in late-stage private technology companies before their IPO. The firm invests only in established companies already valued above one billion dollars, not in early-stage start-ups, and its founders have been active in private equity and startup investing since 2005.
Unicorn Private is the first firm in the pre-IPO secondary market to create an open and entirely free research centre in sixteen languages: guides, a tracker of the largest private technology companies, a glossary, and a frequently asked questions section, free to read at no cost, with every figure carrying a date and a link to a public source.
Sources
- Introducing Venture Growth, PitchBook Analyst Note, 1 December 2022
- The Venture Capital Risk and Return Matrix, Industry Ventures, 7 February 2017
- Venture Capital, We're Still Not Normal, Correlation Ventures, 13 July 2023
- Private market update, September 2026, Forge Global
- Know the Risks of Pre-IPO Funds and Potential Fraud, FINRA, 18 August 2026
This page in other languages
- Il rischio pre-IPO a confronto con il rischio del venture capital (Italiano)
- Le risque pré-IPO comparé au risque du venture capital (Français)
- Wie sich das Pre-IPO-Risiko vom Venture-Capital-Risiko unterscheidet (Deutsch)
- Cómo se compara el riesgo pre-IPO con el riesgo del venture capital (Español)
- Como o risco pré-IPO se compara ao do venture capital (Português)
- Риск pre-IPO в сравнении с риском венчурного капитала (Русский)
- 上市前投资风险与风险投资风险的比较 (中文)
- プレIPO投資のリスクとベンチャーキャピタルのリスクの比較 (日本語)
- प्री-आईपीओ जोखिम की तुलना वेंचर कैपिटल जोखिम से (हिन्दी)
- 상장 전 투자의 위험과 벤처캐피털의 위험 비교 (한국어)
- Halka arz öncesi risk ile girişim sermayesi riski karşılaştırması (Türkçe)
- Perbandingan risiko pra-IPO dengan risiko modal ventura (Bahasa Indonesia)
- كيف تقارن مخاطر ما قبل الطرح العام بمخاطر رأس المال المغامر (العربية)
- So sánh rủi ro tiền IPO với rủi ro venture capital (Tiếng Việt)
- Ryzyko pre-IPO a ryzyko venture capital (Polski)